arises between this psychological and somatic readying for the delivery of lethal violence and the restraint required in the pursuit of counter-insurgency.

The final chapter considers the long-term implications of these above trends, discerning the ascendancy of a post-human military culture that presents a profound challenge to the Marine Corps’s identity and, beyond that, to some of the fundamental traits of the human experience of war throughout history. Indeed, when the Pentagon’s advanced R&D arm asserts that soldiers with ‘no physical, physiological, or cognitive limitations will be key to survival and operational dominance in the future’ (p.128), it suggests there will be very little place for the human and its foibles on tomorrow’s battlefield. Increasingly subsumed within cybernetic architectures of perception and cognition involving sensor fusion, artificial intelligence decision aids, and synthetic visual environments, the contemporary warfighter can already be understood as merely one information-processing node connected to the wider military network of organised violence. Pettegrew sombrely notes that ‘one senses a computational model eclipsing an anthropological conception of marines and soldiers and a convergence in perspective between the human warfighter and automated weapons system’ (pp.159-160). Among its most fateful consequences is the delimiting of ‘warrior subjectivity [as] a self-reflexive perspective on one’s place and actions’ (p.160) that must surely be the basis for individual ethical decision-making on the battlefield, however fraught any such moral agency can ever be.

While some readers will perhaps balk at some of Pettegrew’s boldest conclusions, they will all certainly find in Light It Up a provocative and important investigation of the optics of modern combat and a considered reflection upon its ramifications for a warrior ethos that is central to the Marine Corps’s self-identity and the repository of an age-old search for meaning amidst the searing experience of combat.

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David French’s The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1954-1967 (Oxford University Press, 2011) provided a reliable, comparative and thematic guide to Britain’s postwar campaigns, with categories such as the ‘Colonial State’, ‘Varieties of Coercion’, ‘Dirty Wars’ and ‘Winning Hearts and Minds’. It also advanced the thesis that, however nuanced and politically aware Britain’s campaigns might have been, at one level they
worked by demonstrating that Security Forces could ‘intimidate’ civilian populations more than insurgents could (*The British Way*, p. 251).

In *Fighting EOKA* French allows himself the luxury of a more forensic, and more chronological, analysis of one conflict. One of the smaller postwar conflicts at that. Where 1950s Kenya had a population of over 7 million and Malaya one approaching 6 million, Cyprus boasted just 573,000 souls when EOKA forces set off 16 bombs on the night of 31 March to 1 April 1955, of whom 77% were Greek Cypriot and most of the rest Turkish Cypriots. Whereas over 1,000 Mau Mau supporters were hanged, and over 200 in Malaya, just 9 Cypriots received the same penalty. The reduced scale allows intense scrutiny. EOKA’s insurgent force scarcely rose above 300, and though it could engineer intense bursts of high intensity bombings, ambushes and assassinations, it struggled to sustain incident rates of more than a handful per week. Yet, as French shows, EOKA made up for lack of scale by the breadth, historical roots and intensity of support for its aim, which was *enosis*, unity with Greece. The combination of Archbishop Markarios III’s Greek Cypriot Church and youth movements, with Colonel Grivas’s strategic adeptness at the head of EOKA, proved impossible to crush, with repressive security measures such as cordon and search, detention without trial, and punitive actions, often proving to have been politically counter-productive. While British authorities might think caning schoolboy protestors a relatively mild and appropriate response to teenagers who hurled rocks, boycotted lessons and even assisted assassins – it inevitably branded the authorities as child beaters.

This book’s forensic approach allows it to pick over the intricacies of the conflict. Several chapters are broadly chronological (having first introduced the ‘Colonial State’ and EOKA as opponents), but within that return repeatedly to look at both government and EOKA strategy. Further intertwined are short examinations of issues such as security force reform, schools, and the recurrent British attempts to broker a political solution or persuade the population that the British were there to stay. Hence as early as October 1955 (p. 93) Britain offered to move towards internal self-government (with a view to eventual self-determination) if Makarios would condemn violence and accept British base rights, and drop ideas of *enosis* or union with Greece in favour of safeguards for Turkish Cypriots. This was not dramatically short of the solution that would work in 1959-60 – independence with safeguards for the Turkish Cypriots and continuing British sovereign base areas (Chapter 7-8, pp. 237-301). French’s chronology nicely captures the irony that blood had to be spilt, and the territory lurch towards inter-communal violence, before the Greek and Turkish governments decided to force that solution rather than face civil war in Cyprus, or worse. By this time the British had showed they could keep a lid on violence, EOKA had showed that it could survive and could always draw on wider support periodically to intensify strikes and sabotage; and the Turkish Cypriots (who
also increasingly became the mainstay of the police) had shown that they would fight for partition and against enosis. The United Nations also played its part by issuing merely anodyne resolutions, such as that in February 1957 calling for a peaceful solution: thus crushing EOKA and Greek hopes of clearer international support for enosis.

Governor Harding declared a state of Emergency on 26 November 1955, tightening security operations and making it clear that the British would both protect and punish according to situation, in an attempt to establish ‘a balance of fear’. Collective punishment of villages for withholding information could include curfews, fines, closures, evictions and movement restrictions (p. 137). Harding also brought to bear his experience as Commander in Chief Far Eastern Land Forces during the Malayan Emergency. He divided the territory into 8 Districts each with a District Commissioner and 3 areas under Assistant DCs, each chairing a military-police-civil District Security Committee (DSC) that could direct operations, and each with a joint police-military operations room. He also emphasised generating information by maintaining a security framework. In the larger colonies that had pivoted around resettlement in New Villages. That was not contemplated in a cash-strapped Cyprus awash with lawyers and journalists and under the watchful eye of Greece, and so it had to be achieved instead by a combination of patrols, snap roadblocks and searches, and operations (p. 131). These were supplemented by some more subtle Malayan and Kenyan techniques, such as Q patrols (taking out surrendered enemy personnel in the hope of spotting or snaring insurgents) and use of counter-gangs pretending to be EOKA supporters (pp. 145-50). The sheer level of detail allows French to capture the complexity, while also busting some lazy myths such as large operations always being flops, whereas he shows that while some were, others proved instrumental in disrupting and disaggregating insurgent groups (p. 135-8).

This book provides a new and important contribution beyond its sheer comprehensiveness. First of all, it achieves a detailed and nuanced tracing of the operations and strategies of both sides. Toing and froing between British and EOKA perspectives the book creates a sense of how events were driven by the interaction to the two. Later chapters add analysis of the Greek and Turkish government positions, which at times fuelled the conflict, but ultimately culminated in them brokering an agreement in the period between December 1958 and February 1959. Secondly, French brings the story up-to-date by making extensive use of relatively recently released files (notably the FCO141 series from the National Archives at Kew). These have been skilfully blended with older sources, for instance new FCO141 files on Grivas are combined with his memoirs and other works on the EOKA leader. In addition, Imperial War Museum Sound Archives and other sources are used to inject the British Army’s officers’ and soldiers’ perspectives. Thirdly, this blend of sources allows an equally nuanced investigation of the positive – and the
more punitive and violent – aspects of both sides. Hence French is blunt about the role (and to some extent incompetence) of EOKA’s ‘enforcement terrorism’ (p. 158-74) in sustaining its campaign, it may have killed 187 ‘traitors’ and injured another 181, sometimes choosing deliberately public, demonstrative sites such as coffeeshops. On the other hand, Chapter 6 on ‘The Nazi Methods of Hitler’ (pp. 194-236 and the summary at p. 307) is a master class in analysing British limitation and toleration of abuse, severe methods of interrogation, and ‘torture’. For this reader, at least, this chapter is the most compelling and the one with the most contemporary resonance. The book is particularly effective and scathing in its account of the whitewash in the aftermath of Mrs Cunliffe’s murder in October 1959. Tens of Cypriots were beaten as soldiers took revenge, and three died (pp. 208-11). Even if accusations of British torture in Cyprus do not now reach the British courts, as they did for Kenya, issues such as why and how limitations on coercion fail, and why and how ‘enquiries’ are stymied, are of more than mere historical importance. French’s chapter 6 and related sections on courts, law and abuses are therefore deeply relevant as well as superbly crafted and balanced pieces of scholarship.

In short, this is an authoritative and exhaustive resource for anyone who needs to understand the Cyprus emergency in its domestic and international aspects or is interested in issues surrounding the control of force and reactions to excessive force and losses of control.

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Detailed studies of the Peninsular War abound but, until recently, few considered in depth the individual components of Wellington’s Army. William Napier’s infantry-centric and xenophobic work on the war was significantly improved upon by Sir Charles Oman’s seminal study but it is only recently that comprehensive works have been published on the cavalry (Fletcher, I., Galloping at Everything, Staplehurst, 1999) and the artillery (Lipscombe, N., Wellington’s Guns Oxford, 2013). Consequently, a study and published work on Wellington’s engineers was only a matter of time.

The subject was selected by the author for his PhD thesis and he has chosen to adapt and expand it for a wider audience. The bibliography bears testament to his significant research; most notably from the archives of the Royal Engineers’ Museum where a number of new primary sources have been revealed. Thompson highlights