Nevertheless, this is highly impressive collection of essays. As Brian Bond observes in his foreword, it is hugely reassuring to see the arrival of a new generation of military historians of ‘proven ability and admirable dedication’. Both Spencer Jones, the editor, and Duncan Rogers of Helion must be commended for providing a superb volume in which these writers can display their talents.

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Given the attention lavished on irregular warfare over the past decade or so, it is hardly surprising that Clausewitz’s ideas on such matters have attracted interest. To date, however, most of his relevant writing has remained untranslated and therefore inaccessible to those without German. An exception is the short Chapter 26, “Arming the People”, that appears in Book VI of *Vom Kriege*. Christopher Daase and James W. Davis have sought to rectify this situation by presenting us with some additional pieces of Clausewitz’s work—in each case translations of documents originally edited by the German scholar Werner Hahlweg. An introductory essay by Davis explores the relevance of this material to recent debates within Clausewitz scholarship.

Much the longest of these documents consists of Clausewitz’s notes on small war, which he delivered as lectures at the *Kriegsakademie* in 1810 and 1811. Here he addresses, in great detail, the well-established practice of small war that had developed during the previous century. This involved independent operations by small units of (mostly) regular soldiers whose mission was to provide security for the main body of an army through activities such as reconnaissance, screening and delaying the enemy’s approach. Such units routinely encountered numerically superior forces and were therefore encouraged to eschew decisive engagements. Emphasis was placed on exploiting mobility and surprise, and on employing musketry rather than shock action. As such there was something of the modern-day guerrilla about their exploits, although these were intended to support the operations of a regular army.

Also included is Clausewitz’s *Bekenntnisdenkshrift* of 1812, which contains an argument for the feasibility of renewed (post-Tilsit) resistance against France, by means of both regular forces and popular resistance in the form of a *Landsturm*. Here he views the latter’s task as one of conducting raids against enemy forces that penetrated into the
interior of Prussia. This would involve bands of locally based fighters attacking lines of communication and vulnerable detachments of the enemy, before dispersing in the face of concerted counter-attack. The goal here would be to impose attrition on the enemy, and also to draw off forces that would otherwise be used against the Prussian regular army. Clausewitz’s models in this regard were provided by the Vendée and Spain, and it is interesting to see him drawing inspiration from them as he sketches out a theory of people’s war.

The third document is Clausewitz’s 1819 memorandum in support of a peacetime militia known as the Landwehr. Here he seeks to address conservative fears that putting weapons into the hands of the people would make the state increasingly vulnerable to revolution. The abolition of the Landwehr would, he argues, make Prussia more vulnerable to attack by neighbouring states whilst doing little to bolster internal stability. This is because popular discontent would as likely affect the regular Prussian army as the people at large. Such was the case, he contends, during the French Revolution. Consequently the best solution is not to disarm the people, but to govern them wisely and honestly.

The book closes with a new translation of the previously mentioned Book VI, Chapter 21 of Vom Kriege. This chapter provides a more concise account of the techniques of people’s war previously discussed in Clausewitz’s Bekenntnisdenkshrift.

In sum, Daase and Davis’ collection serves to round out our appreciation of Clausewitz’s views on small war and people’s war alike. These views are very much a product of their time. In the case of small wars, they are intimately bound up with the technical characteristics of warfare during the early nineteenth century. In the case of people’s war, they represent a perceptive and reasoned effort to harness the potential of popular participation in war to the concerns of military strategy. In this latter regard it is interesting to note that Clausewitz views people’s war only as an auxiliary to the operations of regular armies. Unlike later theorists he does not regard it as a means of fighting without regular forces altogether.

As Davis observes in his introduction, the fact that Clausewitz’s interests extended well beyond regular warfare is pertinent to scholarly debates surrounding the interpretation of Vom Kriege and its relevance to contemporary forms of conflict. Indeed, those arguing that Clausewitz’s ideas are of enduring importance will find new sources of support in this book.

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