Linn’s clear explanations, illuminating examples, and easy, occasionally cutting, prose make Elvis’s Army accessible to casual readers. Yet it is also a seminal work. No historian of the American army during the Cold War can ignore this important book, whilst its comprehensive treatment of the subject will make it an invaluable source for any scholar whose work intersects in any way.

J. P. CLARK
U. S. ARMY


To try and condense the interactions and connections between the Royal Navy and the British Imperial experience in just over 200 pages is a daunting task. Spence does an admirable job in selecting the parts of that enormous historical storehouse that make for not only a good story, but a useful overview of the complexity of that relationship. His analysis emphasises the point that the Royal Navy was the Empire, and vice versa. One did not, and could not exist as it did without the other. Therefore, which phenomenon is causal is a question that is dependent on the methodological lens one wishes to look through.

Spence follows the evolution of the Royal Navy as a fighting force, from its modest and local ability to project power into the European balance of power, to a more global reach. The links between trade and commerce, ports, societies and exploration of a globalising world are all addressed in this quick tour through the various tasks and missions of the Navy for the empire. Therefore, there is a subtle sophistication to the book as it moves from British culture, maritime literature, identity, commerce, technology, politics and military elements in a seamless and logical progression. What is provided is a nuanced and complex picture of how the Navy not only protected the empire but connected it as well. Sports, science, religion, law, and ethics were all transmitted throughout the world through the medium of the Navy as the life-blood of the empire. It is from this formative perspective that Spence makes the case of the Navy and British Empire being the bedrock of the modern globalised world.

The book’s analysis of the rise of land and air power within the British arsenal raises interesting questions that can be of use to policy makers even in today’s post-Brexit Britain. Without a major naval contribution to make, either to its own national security or in alliance with other necessary powers, the fate of the island state was in peril. Lapses in naval focus allowed other powers to erode either the territorial,
commercial or cultural influence being exerted onto the world’s stage. That diminishment of influence corresponded to a diminishment of Britain’s ability to combine diplomatic, economic and military power to best advantage. The exposure to these ideas is not nearly long enough, however, more a mere appetiser of thought that requires satisfaction to be found elsewhere. That is the pity of the book overall, that it is not allowed to be more substantial and explorative on many of the intelligent and nuanced connections it makes to explain the Navy and empire’s ability to create power.

Such a case has been made before and by many over the past two or three decades, some in more detail regarding the various constituent parts of the empire, some with a greater depth of explanation of the Navy’s role. The bibliography and footnotes provided in this study will allow readers interested in the ideas introduced so well here to be followed up for further investigation. The story also is not London centric, flipping around the empire to give tastes of the Australian, Indian, Canadian and other far-flung commentaries on the imperial system. Through such a geographically diverse approach the book allows the reader to engage more fully with the entirety of the topic in question and avoids creating a uniform vision of empire and naval power. As a first introduction to the idea of empire and the naval power that underpinned and represented it, this book is well worth a look. It is one of those works that is more than what it at first appears to be, a rare thing in this age of academic hyperbole and self-declared “definitive” studies. Easy to read and follow, the book is a pleasure to have on one’s shelf.

GREG KENNEDY
King’s College London


Out of the quagmires of Iraq and Afghanistan emerged a reluctance within the Transatlantic policymaking community to deploy large numbers of combat troops to fight the internal wars of others. Much better, it was argued, to send smaller numbers of military advisors and let the locals do their own fighting. This idea held obvious attractions. It demonstrated commitment without actually committing much, it provided seemingly meaningful participation without unwanted publicity, and it was relatively cheap in terms of blood and treasure. However, as the authors of this new book highlight, the proponents of the 'advisory' fad, like the counterinsurgency