provided the background to the latter’s rejection of the Church of England within half a decade of his ordination. Warwick Louth’s essay looks at the literary output of the military revolution and seeks to place the military manuals alongside battlefield archaeology as a means of developing our understanding of the conflict. This is a useful corrective to attempts to understand battles through text alone and incorporates psychology, practicability and detailed knowledge to explain how concentrations of recovered objects, i.e. detritus left behind by musketeers in action, can inform the observer of the type of action undertaken at a given site. This essay serves almost as a vade mecum for battlefield exploration.

Essays by Stephen M Rutherford and Eric Gruber von Arni cover the medical aspects of the civil war from the perspective of surgical knowledge and hospital organisation. Rutherford looks at battlefield surgery via the lens of manuals and recorded experience and compares the practice with both contemporary and later practices. He concludes this fascinating essay by suggesting that whilst all surgeons of the civil wars would be equally skilful, some were pioneers of war-related and emergency surgery. Von Arni paints a different picture for his essay examines the ‘horrendous’ royalist medical organisation. There was no planned response, very little of the expertise Rutherford discusses available because the College of Physicians favoured parliament.

Beyond the content of the essays themselves there is an introduction to vibrant collections of fields of study, for each essay hints at greater works in progress. The book is encouraging for both those who seek to enter the world of the Civil War and related military research and for those long immersed in it. The structure is well-considered, the content more than sufficiently diverse in both form and content to show that there is lots to be done in assessing generals, battlefields, military operations, medical experience and practice, the involvement of religion and networks of soldiers to excite yet further study.

MARTYN BENNETT
Nottingham Trent Univers


Historians at the University of Edinburgh tell a story, probably apocryphal, of a visit many years ago by an eminent Canadian historian. The visitor was asked to deliver a public lecture during his visit. He asked his hosts what they wanted him to speak about
and they suggested the War of 1812 as a topic. The visitor is said to have responded: ‘The War of 1812, splendid! The Americans think they won, the Canadians think they won, and the British don’t know they were in it’. That aphorism concisely sums up the issues that Troy Bickham seeks to address in this fine book on the conflict. Originally published in 2012 to mark the bicentenary of the outbreak of the war, *The Weight of Vengeance* has recently been published in paperback. It is a welcome addition to the literature on a conflict that remains misunderstood and confusing to many students and even historians who are non-specialists in the period. That the War of 1812 should remain so misunderstood after two centuries is, itself, a mystery. It has been well archived on both sides of the Atlantic. The main sources, predominantly in a single language – English, are readily available (mainly in Britain, Canada, the United States, and, increasingly, on the internet). Nonetheless the War of 1812 has not generated the kind of historiographical attention that have the American War of Independence or the Napoleonic wars (of which it was a theatre). *The Weight of Vengeance* seeks to remedy this deficiency. Bickham, who is Professor of History at Texas A&M University, has consulted sources on both sides of the Atlantic in both print and manuscript and written a balanced and elegant study that assesses the causes and course of the conflict as well as the negotiations that brought it to an end from the perspective of its main protagonists: the United States and the British Empire. The result is one of the most important studies of the war to emerge from the war’s recent bicentennial.

Bickham demonstrates persuasively that the War of 1812 was fought in the shadow of the earlier American War of Independence. To some extent the ‘Second War of Independence’ as it was known to some Americans arose from unresolved issues that lingered after the 1783 Peace of Paris. For Americans, it was an opportunity to eliminate British trade restrictions which called the sovereignty of the new republic into question. For the British, the conflict was an opportunity to consolidate and expand imperial control in North America. For Canadians, Native Americans and British West Indians, the conflict was an opportunity to regain some of the authority and autonomy lost in the previous conflict within a revamped British Empire. Bickham delineates and assesses these different motives. In so doing he transcends previous nationalist-oriented accounts that seek to ‘prove’ that one protagonist or another was correct. When viewed from London or Washington one sees differing impulses and objectives that drove the decision to wage war in June 1812. Bickham carefully untangles them.

The War of 1812 itself was relatively short-lived. The conflict lasted just two and a half years from June 1812 until January 1815. Bickham provides a clear analysis of the conflict as waged by the United States and the British Empire. His account isn’t so much a study of various campaigns as of how the protagonists waged war in the service of their wider strategic objectives. It is most valuable, and original in the use of

www.bjmh.org.uk
newspapers to assess public opinion in Britain and the United States. Bickham does a wonderful job of recreating popular attitudes toward the conflict. Having assessed the causes and course of the conflict Bickham provides a detailed description of the peace negotiations which brought the war to an end. His is the best analysis of the peace negotiations and the resulting Treaty of Ghent since Henry Adams’s account more than a century ago.

Apropos to the words of the historian who visited Edinburgh long ago, Bickham concludes that the new American republic won the war in the sense that its claims to independence and, crucially, to western expansion at the expense of native peoples, arguably the war’s biggest losers, were vindicated. Britain, which had committed considerable resources to the conflict, was ultimately compelled to accept and respect American sovereignty. For British North Americans in what would later become Canada the memory of the conflict, and their role in resisting invasion by the United States would play a crucial role in helping to consolidate a Canadian national identity after Confederation in 1867. That a book on a war ends with a chapter entitled, ‘Who won the War of 1812?’ is testimony indeed of the need for such a well-research, well-written study. It should find a wide readership among students of the histories of the British Empire, the early United States, and pre-Confederation Canada.

FRANK COGLIANO
University of Edinburgh


Military historians who research strategic functions of the British army tend to overlook the significance of soldiers’ personal equipment and how it affects day-to-day operations in the field. Historically, uniforms were as much a part of a soldier’s equipment as was his weapon. Uniforms provided multifaceted benefits. Uniforms protected men from the elements and were also a key to professing allegiance. Uniforms were a device through which to unite the troops, and this unification affected the conduct of war. A united force is a stronger force. The power of the British army uniform is fully portrayed in this excellent book by Carl Franklin.

A feast for the eyes with prolific, colourful imagery, the author identifies the uniforms worn by the British army from 1751 to 1783. In overwhelming detail, the author