references are rightly made to the contributions of Kitchener, MacDonald and Girouard but not to the crucial role of Wingate as an intelligence gatherer, analyst, and propagandist. Finally, Farwell perpetuates the myth that the South African War was a ‘white man’s war’, and that it was only ‘towards the end of the war when the British armed native scouts and guards’ (p. 349). In fact, Black Africans provided invaluable firepower in the defence of Mafeking and, by 1900, armed Black Africans served on both sides of the investment. Unfortunately, in describing the Mafeking siege, Farwell relies upon the highly tendentious commentary of Brian Gardner and depicts it as ‘something of a lark’ (p. 352).

The balance of the writing, too, is somewhat awry, with extensive coverage of the campaigns in India and on the North-West Frontier, but scant commentary upon Canadian expeditions (other than Wolseley’s Red River campaign), and perfunctory remarks on the Maori wars, and only twelve pages devoted to the 3-month Anglo-Transvaal War compared with fourteen pages allocated to the 32-month South African War (which Farwell wrote about separately).

Unfortunately, the lapses of balance and analysis largely detract from the value of this volume, but it is useful to remember how British military history was once written to appreciate the progress that has since been made.

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For Payne, there are three types of strategists: the ‘unconscious’, the ‘egoistical’, and the ‘angry’. Indeed, for the author, strategy is as emotional as it is steeped in conscious and unconscious decisions made by individuals. Consequently, he uses the Vietnam War as a lens through which he analyses the impact of political, emotion, and chance
on the individuals who shaped the course of the war. The Clausewitz connection comes in the form of Payne expanding on one of the famed strategist’s maxims. As stated by Payne, ‘Clausewitz was onto something important when it came to rationality’ (p. 5). Yet, “Clausewitz allowed plenty of scope for war as a non-instrumental phenomenon too. Seeing war as purposeful did not necessarily mean seeing it as narrowly rational” (p. 5). From here, Payne gets to his argument that ‘Wars are fought in pursuit of honour and prestige, as well as through fear. And for all these motives, human psychology—the perception of reality and the motivations for behaviour is fundamental’ (p. 6).

Each chapter commences with a brief discussion of Clausewitz’s ideas to set-up a more in-depth conversation of the abstract motivators exhibited by Johnson and Nixon. In Chapter Four, for example, Payne addresses Clausewitz’s assertion ‘Of all the passions that inspire man in battle, none, we have to admit, is so powerful and so constant as the longing for honour and renown’ (p. 89). Upon quoting the Prussian military theorist, Payne delves into the abstract – the thoughts and feelings of Johnson and Nixon - that pushed the two presidents often to act irrationally. Citing specific knee-jerk decisions made by each president, the author unveils the humanity behind strategy. Indeed, strategy is not always borne out of forethought. In one example of Nixon reacting to a perceived slight against him in the form a leak in the New York Times, Payne states ‘a fuming Nixon called Kissinger many times; at least ten’ (p. 92). In another episode, Payne writes that in response to another leak, Nixon ‘demanded sackings – a trademark Nixon habit when under stress’ (p. 92).

Audio recording transcripts and secondary literature, with an emphasis on the latter, buttress Payne’s work. Appropriately, The Psychology of Strategy contains discussion of the historiography on the strategy of the war. Payne draws most heavily on the literature of the revisionist school, especially the works of Lewis Sorely and Harry Summers. The author, too, refers to the contentious work of Nick Turse. As a result, readers seeking a more nuanced discussion of Westmoreland, Abrams, and strategic decision making during the war should look elsewhere. Recent works by Gregory Daddis offer a far more balanced and detailed conversation.

What Payne ultimately offers is a reminder that people create strategy. Strategists are influenced by how they feel and react to external stimuli, consciously or unconsciously. Thus emotions, like the needs of the state, sway decision-making. By design, Payne forgoes discussions of much of the context surrounding the Vietnam War, assuming readers of his work are already familiar with the scholarship or at least capable of familiarizing themselves. As noted by Payne himself, The Psychology of Strategy speaks to those involved, or at least interested, in strategic studies (p. 182). Therefore, Payne’s prose is for academics and not someone new to the discourse.

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Between the middle of December 2015 and the end of January 2016, the Museum of Liverpool exhibited Dry Your Eyes Princess, a series of large-scale portraits by the photographer Stephen King. The exhibition captured the ‘pinnacle moments’ of 12 veterans of the British Armed Forces all of whom are trans*, an umbrella term for people whose gender identity and/or gender expression differs from the sex they were assigned at birth. One of those images depicts Caroline Paige, the first trans* officer to have served openly in the British Armed Forces. In the image, Paige stands in a field of crops under a rolling sky, holding her decorated Royal Air Force No.1 jacket at arms’ length. It is a photograph that neatly sums up the content of True Colours, and Paige’s career, specifically her self-imposed solitude and her later success in challenging the Royal Air Force’s reluctance to acknowledge gender diversity. Given that we know very little about institutional responses to trans* personnel, True Colours provides a crucially important account of one woman’s personal battle for recognition and acceptance.

Historically, and as work by Woodward and Winter has demonstrated, diversity and gender difference has always been problematised by the British Armed Forces. Despite the optimism of one senior official remarking on the case of Major Joanne Rushton in 1998, that the Army ‘does not have a policy on transsexuals as such because we are an equal-opportunities employer’, possessing a trans* identity in the Armed Forces was usually conflated with same-sex desire and could result in a period of detention and discharge under the crime of indecency, the catch-all term for same-sex activity. In 1999, the ban was lifted on open service in the British Armed Forces for lesbian, gay and bisexual personnel. However, trans* people remained conspicuously absent from the new policy. This changed in 2007 with the release of a DIN, or Defence Information Notice, which applied to all three services. Prior to this, trans* personnel were treated on a case-by-case basis, which meant that responses were hugely inconsistent.

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