between local women and American GIs, not just in Okinawa but also in many other Asian nations allied with the US. Finally, Crissey’s identity as an Okinawan woman helps her address the importance of the island’s culture and community, with an insider’s perspective on problems and controversies that all Okinawans continue to face.

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It is always a pleasure to review a first-class work of historical analysis. I have no hesitation in saying that David Alvarez and the late Eduard Mark’s, *Spying Through A Glass Darkly* is an excellent example of careful scholarship, which deals with an under-researched area of United States intelligence studies, the interregnum between the 1946 closure of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), America’s first world-wide intelligence service, and the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947. Standard accounts of the end of the Second World War see a naive America dismantling the splendid intelligence apparatus created with such care by General ‘Wild Bill’ Donovan (much as Henry Stimson had shut down the successful American First World War code-breaking Black Chamber, with the tart observation, ‘Gentlemen do not read each other’s mail’), only to discover that the wicked Soviets were engaged in espionage against them throughout the conflict, especially atomic spying, and that President Truman needed, in double quick time, to undo the sin of dismantling OSS and firing its charismatic leader, and then create a brand new central intelligence organisation.

Notwithstanding, the doubtful effectiveness of OSS the book’s key point is that the end of Donovan’s organisation did not mean the end of America’s intelligence effort. Not only did the US army’s Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) step into the breach left by disbanding OSS, but the little known Strategic Services Unit (SSU) also undertook espionage against the Soviet target. It is this group that is the real study of this wide-ranging work, which covers operations in Germany, France Hungry, Italy, the Vatican, Turkey, Iran and Greece. Moreover, it includes valuable portraits of familiar figures like James Jesus Angleton, the CIA’s legendary head of counterintelligence, at that point an SSU Lieutenant in Italy, as well as useful analyses of still puzzling figures like the

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double agent Richard Kauder and his Max South network of agents inside Russia (a network which was almost certainly a NKVD deception operation).

The authors note that, given the rapid demobilisation of US military forces in 1945-46, staff levels and budget constraints made it difficult for the surviving intelligence agencies to develop effective operations against the Soviet target. Moreover, for much of 1945, the main target of both CIC and SSU in Germany was preventing a Nazi revival and gathering evidence for prosecuting war crimes. This diversity of direction and purpose in America’s remaining intelligence organisations undermines the frequently made assertion that the US, often in conjunction with British Intelligence, struck the first blows of the Cold War by running penetration operations against the Soviet zones of occupation in Germany and Austria.

In fact, the United States had already embraced the concept of total intelligence; the collection of information on all countries friend or foe and as Alvarez and Mark cogently argue intelligence interest in a country does not imply ‘fear, hostility or evil designs’ against that particular country. The anti-Soviet suspicions of 1947-48 were generally absent in 1945 but the US was certainly gathering intelligence on the Soviet Union, mainly through interrogating captured German personnel with experience of the East. It’s in this context that the US Army’s employment of ex-Nazi intelligence assets like General Gehlen needs to be understood. Another example is the attitude of the US toward captured German code breakers and cypher experts. For much of 1945-46 army intelligence, while delighted to have access to their equipment and intercepts, was interested less in their spying against the Soviet Union than in what these men knew about British and American codes and communications.

Despite these difficulties, US intelligence, particularly SSU, did score intelligence successes. It made accurate predictions about the rapid recovery of the Soviet economy, which convinced Washington that Moscow couldn’t be blackmailed by withholding US credits for post-war development. On the military side, it was able to prove that Turkish fears of a Soviet invasion in 1946 were exaggerated, but this did nothing to prevent Turkey joining the NATO alliance shortly after its creation.

Much of the research from this book was done before Eduard Mark’s untimely death in 2009. This may account for one curious lacuna. Though the British intelligence services are mentioned, there is no use of the official history of SIS by Keith Jeffery, which would have helped contextualise Anglo-US intelligence activity in the immediate post-war period.
Having said that Spyng Through A Glass Darkly is a first-rate piece of writing and a fitting tribute to its authors. It will be of use not only to students of intelligence history but to anyone interested in the early Cold War.

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This edited volume is part of Palgrave’s Gender and History series and acts as an effective companion volume to Gender and Conflict since 1914 (2012) edited by Ana Carden-Coyne. It adopts an impressively global approach, addressing gender identities within thirteen countries and across four continents. Overall, Gender and the Second World War is a fascinating and highly readable collection which sets out the premise that ‘the existence, definition, causes, practices, and consequences of war cannot be understood without using gender as a category of analysis’ (p. 1). The first two parts of the book address gender identities in the forces and on the home front, the third explores the meeting places between military and civilian identities and the final section addresses contemporary and retrospective representations of the war. Following Corinna Peniston-Bird’s ‘concept of fuzzy boundaries’, exploring the centre of the gender spectrum where masculinities and femininities overlap, this volume underscores the mutability of gender identities (p. 6). In the introductory chapter, the editors provide a useful synthesis of historiographical debates relating to the impact of war on gender relations, roles and identities. The subsequent chapters embrace a diverse range of topics including Italian Fascism and masculinities, contested masculinities within the front-line Red Army and a case study of a Nazi espionage agent, Hildegard Beetz, in chapters by Lorenzo Benadusi, Robert Dale and Katrin Paehler respectively. Helen Glew deftly addresses attitudes towards married women within public service in Britain and Canada whilst Katherine Jellison’s examines US photographic propaganda which used female bodies, including Amish and Mennonite women, to showcase wartime American life. In a fascinating analysis of Welsh mining communities, Ariane Mak highlights how the recruitment of ‘unskilled’ men into munitions factories led to them earning more than the more respected, ‘skilled’ miners. Mak argues that this destabilisation of communal norms led to ‘a crisis of respectable masculinity’ which was heightened by women’s participation in war work. Emma Vickers and Emma Jackson’s insightful chapter on female impersonators in wartime

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